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Introduction
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Building Automation and Control Systems (BACS) I
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Masaryk University Campus
24 teaching pavilions, over 500 controllers
Building Automation and Control Systems (BACS) II
What are the advantages of flow-based monitoring in BACS networks
and how can it help to detect security issue in these networks?
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BACnetFlow
BACnet Protocol
Communication protocol for BACS networks.
ASHRAE standard 135 – U.S. standard, adapted by ISO, EU.
Contains key information about BACS network traffic.
BACnetFlow
IP flow modification for BACnet networks.
BACnetFlow
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Monitored Network
Masaryk University Network
Including university campus BACS network
BACS network
BACnet
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Part II
Use Case I – Intrusion Detection
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Attack from Building Automation System
AIDRA Botnet in Nutshell
Linux malware – IRC bots with central C&C servers.
Based on source code of Hydra botnet.
Attacks poorly-configured ARM, MIPS, MIPSEL, PPC and
SH4 Linux embedded devices (default Telnet credentials).
First attacks observed at Masaryk University on 2011-12-04.
AIDRA in action (screenshot of 2011.1 private version)
source – http://www.ahacktivia.org (2011-12-08)
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AIDRA Infected Device
Modular automation station for intelligent building.
Communication protocols – BACnet/IP and TCP/IP.
Linux based (PPC) – integrated web and telnet server.
AIDRA botnet does not support any targeted
attacks against intelligent buildings!
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Telnet Attacks Against Masaryk University Network
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(1) AIDRA massive horizontal scan 60 to 130 thousand flows (15 minutes window).
(2) AIDRA massive horizontal scan 60 to 130 thousand flows (60 minutes window).
(3) Microsoft Windows infected machines (SYN packet size is 48, 52B).
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Part III
Use Case II – Access Control
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Worldwide Connection Attempts to BACS Network
Attackers’ primary interests were following services - SSH, TELNET,
HTTP, HTTPS, MS-SMB, MSSQL, MSRDP and RADMIN.
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Week-long Access Control Validation Results
Incomming and Outgoing BACS Network Traffic
Direction Protocol Bytes Packets Flows
TCP 2217553 23122 323
In UDP 0 0 0
ICMP 6812 100 96
TCP 15248736 33267 287
Out UDP 2068299 27396 13113
ICMP 4202 65 65
Total 19545602 83950 13884
Found Issues
1) Foreign or public DNS servers e.g. Google Public DNS.
2) MS Windows network connectivity status indicator service.
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Part IV
Use Case III – BACnet Attacks
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BACnet Router Spoofing Attack
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BACnet Router Messages
BACnet over IP routers broadcasting I-Am-Router-To-Network and
I-Could-Be-Router-To-Network messages to the BACS network.
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BACnet Device Discovery DoS Attack
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BACnet Write-Property Attack
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Part V
Conclusion
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Conclusion
Summary
Any embedded device can threaten others.
Flow-based monitoring in BACS networks is valuable source of
information.
Even an application protocol specific attacks can be detected
using flow approach.
Future Work
Detect malfunction/misconfiguration of BACnet devices.
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Thank You For Your Attention!
Pavel Čeleda et al.
celeda@ics.muni.cz
BACnet Toolset
http://dior.ics.muni.cz/∼celeda/bacnet
Flow-based Security Issue
Detection in BACnet
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